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Abstract 
The aim of this work is to shed light on corporate strategy and its drivers towards 
growth and sustainable development through strategic options such as mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As), a strategy mainly used when growth is to be rapidly realized. 
As corporate structure becomes more complex with companies seeking rapid growth, 
diversified risk and global reach, mergers, acquisitions and alliances have become 
common practices for many companies during the last few decades. Whether the goal is 
domestic or international growth, diversification or new market entry, cost efficiency or 
increased sales, companies now are more aware of the importance of sustainable 
strategic growth to rapidly and more efficiently achieve their objectives. Motives behind 
such a step may vary from one company to another taking into account the many 
surrounding factors like the industry, the strategy of the firm and its vision towards a 
long-term sustainable growth and many other factors that would justify such a move. 
Unsurprisingly, more than half of M&As have been proven to be a total or (at least) 
partial failure and have failed to deliver the desired outcomes due to many reasons and 
factors that vary from a case to case. 
Out of the importance and the promising outlook of cross border M&A as a corporate 
growth driver, and in order to bring a sound understanding of such a transaction, 
motives behind it, process and what may lead to success or failure, this dissertation will 
take a case study approach using DaimlerChrysler merger in 1998. This merger was the 
largest at the time with significant potential synergies and growth opportunities. 
However, and regardless of the high potential and strategic fit between Daimler-Benz 
and Chrysler, the significant differences between these two companies in terms of 
culture, governance and management style, as well as the mismanagement of this 
cultural clash after the merger, all of which had furthered the delivery of these 
synergies, triggered underperformance  and consequently led to failure. 
  
Key words: Corporate Strategy, Mergers and Acquisitions, M&A, M&A Success and failure, 
Daimler-Chrysler 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background of the study 
Corporate strategies and structures have evolved in the last few decades and still are 
evolving and assuming more and more complex models as companies always look for a 
potential venture, partner or a new market. In this fast growing and changing business 
world, companies need to strive harder than ever to survive competition, achieve quality 
and excellence and take a lead in their respective market. Any step forward a company 
intends to take should be aligned, justified and rooted in its vision and core strategy in 
order for such objectives to be efficiently realized, and consequently deliver the desired 
value and promise to its stakeholders. 
Therefore, strategic growth of any kind is a long-term objective and should be 
accompanied by solid ground and record of previous successes which would give the 
stakeholders of any company more trust and support to the management decisions and 
would give the management more credibility in leading the company forward (Kummer 
& Steger, 2008). 
Mergers and acquisitions (in the following referred to as M&A) has been used as 
strategic tool for growth and expansion for more than a century and have had a 
significant impact on shaping the business world as we see it today. This dissertation 
seeks to understand the motives, process of M&As and try to investigate and understand 
what might drive this kind of transactions to success and whether we can predict and 
possibly better manage the factors that would trigger success. Motives behind M&As 
have changed since the first practices in late 1890s in the US (Sudarsanam, 2010), 
starting with horizontal mergers where two or more companies that operate and 
compete in the same product market combine their operations to gain market power and 
cut costs, to giant conglomerate corporations we see today where companies converge 
into M&As to execute their diversification strategy and better manage associated risk. 
Therefore, M&A is not an invention of recent times. It first appeared at the end of the 
19th century, and since then, cyclic waves have been observed due to radical different 
strategic motivations (Jansen, 2002, in Picot 2002). A brief look backward at the 
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evolution of M&As and the gradual changes that have occurred in motives and 
characteristics would help to better understand how M&A practices and motives have 
evolved. 
The occurrence and reoccurrence of M&As have been characterized as waves of 
activities which  have made a great transformation and profound changes in the business 
world and led to the complex corporate structures we see today, eliminating markets 
that were composed of small and mid-size firms and bringing the domination of 
multinational corporations (Kummer & Steger, 2008). M&A waves have been caused 
by combination of economic, regulatory and technological changes driving companies 
to consider M&A in order to preserve their competitive position in the market 
(Cordeiro, 2014). 2014 was an optimistic period for M&A with value of M&A reaching 
$1.75 trillion globally  during the first 6 months of the year. As the business world 
seems to become more volatile, companies understand that this volatility might be the 
new standards and in such an environment M&A seems to be an easier way to buy 
growth rather than building it (Cordeiro, 2014). 
Figure 1 represents the first 5 waves of M&A activities in the U.S, which is the country 
with the longest history of M&A and takeover activities going back to 1890s. 
Figure 1: US Merger Waves up to 2000   
Source: (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008) 
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The sixth wave took place later on in the late 2000s (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). 
And we can clearly observe the significant increase in M&A the latest decades. 
The first wave accompanied a massive restructuring for the American industry where 
consolidation of producers took place, creating what was called horizontal 
consolidation, while the second wave witnessed economic growth after the First World 
War and high industrial innovation, being more of a vertical integration oriented 
(Sudarsanam, 2010). The third wave in the late 1960s surpassed the first two waves and 
drew a shift in M&A vision as it involved mostly unrelated mergers aiming at achieving 
growth through diversification into new products' markets boosting the conglomerate 
era for M&As. Subsequently, the fourth wave in the 1980s was characterized by mega 
mergers' wave, and  two types of activities took place: acquisitions and divestitures 
(Sudarsanam, 2010). 
The fifth wave in the 1990s continued the objective of focusing more on core 
competences as a source of competitive advantage and the value of M&A deals was 
$1.6 trillion, while the 6
th
 wave in 2000s which reached its peak in 2007 witnessed 
significant increase in international M&As (Sudarsanam, 2010). The 1980s and 1990s 
witnessed a huge rise in M&A activity as part of a global phenomenon having the 
European Union (EU) and  the UK more present on the scene. Additionally, this was 
accompanied by increased deregulation and privatization to increase competitiveness. 
Globalization and high economic growth was fueling M&A deals across the world 
providing many opportunities to grow and internationalize, all up to 2007 (Sudarsanam, 
2010). 
Globalization has forced many companies to explore M&A as a mechanism towards 
developing an international presence and increasing their market share (Sherman, 
2011). Cross border M&As increased from 23% of total mergers volumes in 1998 to 
45% in 2007 (Erel, Liao & Weisbach, 2012). The huge interests in M&A as field of 
study as well as its importance and impact on the market and economy in a given 
geographical or economical area, makes it crucial to further examine causes and factors 
that led and may lead in the future to success or failure of M&As aiming at bringing a 
sound understanding of the dynamic of these transactions and their outcomes. 
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Table 1 can provide an example of the increase in M&A deals' value across the world 
after 1999. 
Table 1: Largest M&A deals worldwide after 1999 
Rank Year Acquirer Target 
Transaction 
value (in 
bill. USD) 
Industry 
1 1999 Vodafone AirTouch PLC Mannesmann 202.8 Telecommunication 
2 2000 
Merger: America Online 
Inc. (AOL) 
Time Warner 164,7 Mass Media 
3 2007 RFS Holding BV 
ABN-AMRO 
Holding NV 
98.2 Financial Services 
4 2000 Glaxo Wellcome Plc. 
SmithKline 
Beecham Plc. 
76.0 Pharmaceuticals 
5 2004 
Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co. 
Shell Transport 
& Trading 
Co. 
74,6 Oil and gas 
6 2006 AT&T Inc. 
BellSouth 
Corporation 
72,7 Telecommunications 
7 2001 Comcast Corporation 
AT&T 
Broadband & 
Internet 
Svcs 
72,0 Telecommunications 
8 2014 AT&T Inc DIRECTV 65,5 
Media and 
Entertainment 
9 2004 Sanofi-Synthelabo SA Aventis SA 60,2 Pharmaceuticals 
10 2000 Spin-off: Nortel Networks Corporation 60.0 Telecommunications 
11 2002 Pfizer Inc. 
Pharmacia 
Corporation 
59,5 Pharmaceuticals 
12 2004 
Merger: JP Morgan Chase 
& Co. 
Bank One 
Corporation 
58,8 Banking 
Source: Institute of Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances (http://www.imaa-institute.org) / the statistic 
Porter (http://www.statista.com/) 
1.2 Motivation 
M&As are one of the most common practices for firms looking for a rapid growth, and 
consequently have become a common phenomenon in recent times as the M&A scene 
has witnessed stable growth on a domestic as well as international level, especially after 
the recent financial crisis in 2007 (Gupta, 2012). Figure 2 represents the value and 
number of M&A deals worldwide. 
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Figure 2: Value and Number of M&A deals Worldwide 
 
Source: Institute of Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances (http://www.imaa-institute.org) 
M&As certainly are not only a good way, but also a sound tool, to realize strategies in 
certain contexts when they are carried out properly and thoughtfully in line with the 
core corporate strategy. In general, the desire for M&As to be viable solutions is not a 
false hope, the key is the way in which they are approached (Kummer & Steger, 2008). 
As Sudarsanam, 2010 (p.110) states "The challenge for managers is to craft a winning 
business and acquisition strategy, structuring the deal correctly is another challenge." 
Therefore, there is an interesting field of study with many opportunities for future 
research that would provide more evidence in regards to dynamism and performance in 
M&As. 
1.3 Relevance and research goals 
An M&A under the right circumstances is a value creation mechanism (Bruner, 2002), 
and due to the fact that an M&A can rapidly execute a growth strategy comparing to 
other growth tools like organic growth, makes the understanding of the strategic fit, of 
the motives to undergo a merger or an acquisition, of the process of an M&A and the 
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impact of internal and external factors on the deal outcomes, a very valuable piece of 
knowledge. This knowledge is a key to understanding how we could deliver the desired 
outcomes and how an M&A transaction may avoid failure. 
The topic of M&A as a strategic mechanism towards growth and maximization of 
corporate value has been increasingly investigated in the last two decades (Appelbaum, 
Lefrancois, Tonna & Shapiro, 2007) in response to the rise in M&A activities as well as 
to the increasing complexity of those transactions (Gaughan, 2010). Stahl & 
Mendenhall (2005) state that “despite the extensive body of research on M&A that has 
accumulated over the last thirty years, the key factors for M&A success and the reasons 
why so many M&A fail remain poorly understood” (Stahl & Mendenhall, 2005), cited 
by (Rottig, 2007, p. 113), which highlight future opportunities for further research. 
The complexity of businesses and the rapid change that dominates the scene, as well as 
the inconclusive findings in international M&A performance (Blas̆ko, Netter & Sinkey 
Jr, 2000; Rottig, 2007) emphasize the necessity for continuous research in order to 
enrich reliable and credible records to contribute to a better understanding of the 
dynamic of M&A and its value drivers. Understanding factors and reasons behind 
success and failure would allow academics to continuously enrich a solid literature in 
that area of research as well as let business practitioners benefit from historical and 
previous research and practices, in an attempt to optimize outcomes and possibly 
increase possibilities for success. 
On the other hand, understanding why companies consider M&A as a viable tool to 
follow their corporate vision and whether it is strategically fit is of vital importance for 
a successful company. Moreover, understanding the transition that the company 
experiences when it decides to undergo an M&A, the measures that exist to evaluate the 
performance of the new business entity and the impact of industry structure and cultural 
related factors, contribute to better outcomes. 
Around the world, M&A activities have witnessed a significant rise triggered by 
globalization. However up to 83% of those deals underperformed (KPMG, 1999; 
Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005; Sirower, 1997) cited by (Rottig, 2007). Cross-border 
deals (acquiring and target companies that are from different countries) are an 
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unexplained paradox. Despite the low success rate, it is still a popular strategy for 
companies that are looking for global reach (Rottig, 2007). Therefore, having a sound 
understanding of why companies consider this type of transaction is of particular 
importance to answer the following question: 
 What can drive success or failure in a cross-border M&A deal? 
1.4 Structure 
To pursue the research goal, the study is organized as follows: Following this 
introductory chapter, the second chapter will construct the literature review that relates 
to the main goal of this work which is providing a sound  understanding of M&A as a 
strategic growth driver, the nature and mechanism of this transaction and its value 
drivers. The third chapter will introduce the chosen methodology, a case study approach 
that will be applied in the forth chapter to analyze DaimlerChrysler merger in light of 
the reviewed literature. The fifth chapter will represent the conclusion of this work and 
implications for future research.  
8 
Tarek ALDAOUD 
2. Literature Review 
This chapter provides a in-depth review of the M&A literature and constructs a 
theoretical understanding, which directly relates to the goal and main question of this 
work on understanding the M&As in terms of success and failure factors and drivers in 
a cross-border set. After providing a brief definition of corporate strategy (section 2.1), 
followed by the definition of M&A (section 2.2), the different classification of M&A 
deals (section 2.2.1), motives and rationale behind M&A (section 2.2.2), M&A as a 
process of different stages (section 2.2.3), success and failure factors and drivers 
(section 2.3), the impact of industry on M&A (section 2.3.1), the impact of culture on 
M&A (section2.3.2), wrapping up with a section on M&A performance measures 
(section 2.4). 
2.1 Corporate Strategy 
The literature on corporate strategy has provided a fair and enriched comprehension of 
corporate strategy as a discipline and of M&A as a strategic option to expand and grow. 
And while the focus of this work is on M&A, the review regarding corporate strategy 
will be brief to the extent that frames M&A as a highly strategic activity. 
As a simple definition, Corporate strategy is the long term direction of an organization 
and is concerned with the overall scope and core existence of an organization and how 
value is added, all strategic decisions are made at this level (Scholes, Whittington & 
Johnson, 2011). 
Adaptation and repeated evaluation of the validity of a corporation strategy in the long 
term is of great importance towards maintaining a successful strategy, Rumelt (1993) 
argues that "Strategy can neither be formulated nor adjusted to changing circumstances 
without a process of strategy evaluation" and "Strategy evaluation is an attempt to look 
beyond the obvious facts regarding the short-term health of a business, and instead to 
appraise those more fundamental factors and trends that govern success in the chosen 
field of endeavor." (Rumelt, 1993, p. 1). 
Strategic decisions such as growth and expansion through M&As or alliances provide 
an essential element of a successful business strategy and impact the whole 
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organization. The choice to expand domestically or internationally is a crucial decision, 
and in some cases, it is a matter of survival and will determine the future of a company. 
Clear and sound strategy is a key to success for an organization and the starting point of 
any desired success, as it provides stakeholders with a better understanding of what 
values this company stands for and how it is going to maximize its market share, 
staying ahead of competitors and fulfilling stakeholders' expectations. 
2.2 Mergers and Acquisitions 
A merger or an acquisition occurs if at least two companies join together part or all of 
their operations. The main purpose of M&A is to create/add shareholders value, 
meaning that the combined firms have a higher value compared to the separate 
companies. The higher value can result from higher cost-efficiency, higher 
competitiveness, advanced R&D, new technologies, acquisitions of talents and 
competencies, all of which could be achieved through synergies and management 
expertise. 
And while M&A are frequently used together in one term, there exist some differences 
between a merger and an acquisition regarding ownership, management control and the 
relative size of the separate corporations as compared to the combined business (Coyle, 
2000). A merger occurs when two or more companies agree to combine their businesses 
and continue as one new firm rather than operating and remaining separately owned 
with a view to combine the firms‟ resources into a new single company. And in the 
strictest definition, the merging firms‟ shares are replaced by the new company‟s, 
whereas the management control and the ownership remain with the pre-merger 
management and the stockholders. The merging companies have an equal stake in the 
new firm, which is why such a merger is also called a "merger of equals" (Snow, 2011). 
Therefore, we can conclude that a merger happens if: 
 none of the involved firms is considered to be an acquirer, and so all involved 
firms have same interests in initiating and pursuing the deal; 
 the firms have a similar size so one does not dominate the other when they are 
combined; 
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 the two companies form the new management structure; 
 very little cash is involved. Instead, a share swap, i.e. the exchange of one asset 
for another, takes place.  
Mergers are much less common than acquisitions, because in reality, it is very rare that 
two companies are truly equal and can co-exist in a merged fashion. In practice, one 
company always dominates the other. 
A good example of a so-called merger of equals was the merger between Daimler-Benz 
and Chrysler into DaimlerChrysler in 1998. Although labeled as merger of equals 
Daimler‟s top management was controlling the new company, which shows that 
mergers in its purest form are very rare (Hollmann, Carpes  & Beuron, 2010). In fact, 
business practice has shown that "the number of “real” mergers is so low that, for 
practical purposes, “M&As” basically mean “acquisitions”" ("World Investment 
Report: Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions and Development," 2000). 
An acquisition occurs if one corporation either buys a controlling interest in another 
company‟s stock, a business operation including the assets or the entire business entity. 
In an acquisition, the purchase can either be paid in cash or with stocks of the acquirer. 
If the purchase is paid with stocks of the acquirer, the stockholders of the target 
company sell their stocks to the acquirer and receive stocks of the acquiring firm in 
return. In a cash payment, the stockholders of the target firm receive cash in return for 
their shares in the target. An acquisition can also involve both cash and shares (Coyle, 
2000). 
Acquisitions can be full acquisitions that is where the acquirer buys all the shares of the 
target, or partial acquisitions where the buying company acquires a controlling interest 
in the target, which is usually above 50% of the equity but below 100% (Coyle, 2000). 
2.2.1 Classifications of M&A transactions 
M&A take different forms in terms of deal characteristics (Table 2), and have evolved 
overtime according to firms' needs and objectives as well as changes in the business 
world. 
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Table 2: M&A Classifications 
M&A Classifications 
Value Chain Bid's Characteristics Economic/Geographic 
Area  
 Horizontal M&A 
 Vertical M&A 
 Conglomerate M&A 
 Friendly M&A 
 Hostile M&A 
 Domestic M&A 
 Cross-border M&A 
Source: Adapted from (Chen & Findlay, 2003; Gaughan, 2010) 
In the perspective of the value chain, M&As could be classified as following (Chen & 
Findlay, 2003; Gaughan, 2010): 
 Horizontal M&A. Involves two or more companies operating and competing in 
the same product market combine their operations to gain market power; 
 Vertical M&A. Happens between two companies producing different goods or 
services for one specific finished product. A vertical M&A occurs when two or 
more firms that are operating at different levels within an industry's supply chain 
decide to merge operations. An automobile company joining with a parts 
supplier would be an example of a vertical M&A; 
 Conglomerate M&A. Occurs between firms that are involved partially or 
completely in unrelated business activities for the goal of diversification. An 
example of conglomerate M&A is Philip Morris, a tobacco company, which 
acquired General Foods in 1985 for US$5.6 billion (Gaughan, 2010). 
In terms of bid characteristics and how the target is approached, M&A could be 
classified as hostile or friendly (Chen & Findlay, 2003): 
 Hostile. The management of the target firm reject the acquisition offer and the 
acquiring firm makes the offer directly to shareholders offering a higher price 
than the market price; 
 Friendly. Occurs when management of the target firm approves the acquisition 
offer. 
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In terms of market regions and with regards to where the companies involved have their 
home base and operate, M&A could be classified as domestic or cross-border (Chen & 
Findlay, 2003): 
 Cross-border M&A. Occurs when the two firms involved are located in different 
economies, or they are operating within one economy but belonging to two 
different countries; 
 Domestic M&A. Happens when the involved companies originate within one 
country and accordingly operate in that one economy-country. 
2.2.2 The motivations for M&A  
Daniel Vasella, CEO of Novartis in 2002 stated that “It is clear that you cannot stay in 
the top league if you only grow internally. You cannot catch up just by internal growth. 
If you want to stay in the top league, you must combine” (Gupta, 2012, p. 61).  
The primary motivation for M&A deals is the quest for rapid growth. When internal 
growth initiatives do not materialize, or there are no other organic growth options, 
M&A transactions prove to be a favored way to achieve and accelerate growth 
(Kummer & Steger, 2008). Gammelgaard (2004) stated that nowadays the most 
significant motives behind M&A are market share growth and synergies, followed by 
competence-based, diversification and financial synergies. 
Several authors have studied the motives behind M&A (Blas̆ko et al ., 2000; El Zuhairy 
et al., 2015; Gammelgaard, 2004; Motis, 2007; Mukherjee, Kiymaz & Baker, 2004), 
and the rationale behind M&A seems to vary from one deal to another: 
 Market exploitation. As M&A strategy could accelerate growth, increase sales, 
give access to new markets, and consequently lead to greater market power 
(Blas̆ko et al., 2000; El Zuhairy et al., 2015; Gammelgaard, 2004; Motis, 2007); 
 Diversification. M&A can help the company in reducing and better managing 
the risk associated with a firm portfolio of businesses, and increase market share 
through new segments and new product lines (El Zuhairy et al., 2015; 
Gammelgaard, 2004; Motis, 2007); 
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 Financial synergies. As M&A can reduce the financial costs through a change in 
debt/equity ratio, provide potential tax advantages and thus present a change in 
the cost of capital. Additionally, M&A may exploit financial strengths through 
cost reduction, as M&A can lead to economies of scale and scope and in certain 
circumstances an acquisition can provide access to cheaper resources (Blas̆ko et 
al., 2000; El Zuhairy et al., 2015; Gammelgaard, 2004; Motis, 2007; Mukherjee 
et al., 2004); 
 Non-financial synergies. An important driver of M&A, when complementary 
resources are pooled together producing higher efficiency, like R&D and patents 
(El Zuhairy et al., 2015; Gammelgaard, 2004; Motis, 2007; Mukherjee et al., 
2004); 
  Exploration of competences. Through M&A a company can gain access to 
certain competences, such as unique employee skills or knowledge, which can 
lead to a sustained competitive advantage (Gammelgaard, 2004; Graham, 2005; 
Motis, 2007). Furthermore, M&A has become a talent acquisition strategy, as in 
many cases buyers are not necessarily looking for a target companies' hard 
assets, but rather are more interested in thoughts, ideas, expertise and people. 
Graham (2005) suggested that the free market is better at identifying talent, and 
that traditional hiring practices do not follow the principles of free market 
because they depend heavily upon credentials and university degrees. Graham 
identified the trend in which large companies such as Google, Yahoo or 
Microsoft were choosing to acquire startups instead of hiring new recruits 
(Graham, 2005); 
 Improved management which could be brought to the target firm by the 
acquirer, as the acquirer may believe that its management skills and expertise 
would drive the value of the acquired firm to rise under its control (Blas̆ko et al., 
2000; Gaughan, 2010). 
Motives impact the company's decision whether M&A is the right strategy to 
implement. Therefore a profound understanding of the company's motives behind M&A 
is significant to justify M&A as a better strategy to consider (El Zuhairy et al., 2015). 
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2.2.3 M&A as a process 
The complex process which M&A represents has attracted the interest and research 
attention of a broad range of management disciplines including those exploring 
financial, strategic, behavioral, operational and cross-cultural aspects of this challenging 
and risky activity (Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006), pinpointing that success seem to be 
the result of multiple factors connecting on the different levels of the M&A process 
(Gomes, Angwin, Weber & Yedidia Tarba, 2013). Figure 3 represents the process of 
M&A and its gradual complexity. 
  
 
 
In a transaction as complex as M&A, there are many potential problems and pitfalls. 
Some of these problems may arise in the preliminary stages of the process, such as 
forcing a deal that should not be made as a result of mistakes, errors, rushed or 
misleading planning, or the post-merger integration process between the companies, 
which may then become a fiscal or organizational nightmare (Sherman, 2011). 
Task 
Complexity 
The Process and Task Complexity of 
M&A 
Figure 3: Process and Task Complexity of M&A 
Source: Adapted from (Kummer & Steger, 2008) 
Time 
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The starting point is the identification of a target that complements the acquirer's growth 
strategy and goal behind that deal. It clearly takes time and efforts to identify the right 
target company and the “right fit” in terms of product, strategy, financials, and people. 
And given the substantial commitment of financial and human resources to the task of 
corporate development, corporations should do everything they can to ensure their 
transactions are successful (Schmid, Sánchez & Goldberg, 2012). 
The identification and selection of a target firm is followed by due diligence, an 
important investigation that may require external consulting, aiming at a more detailed 
analysis and valuation towards an accurate picture of the target. Furthermore, due to its 
importance, it should be given high attention, because at this stage we still can control 
and predict but yet not guarantee on the outcomes of this deal (Gomes et al., 2013). 
Thorough evaluation and investigation of the strategic, financial and cultural fit of both 
entities during due diligence could be a determinant of M&A's outcomes as analysis 
reveals that detailed evaluation of the target firm's employees and business capabilities 
improves M&A performance (Ahammad & Glaister, 2013). 
After the deal closes comes the most important stage of the transaction which is the 
post-M&A integration, holding a huge impact on determining the deal's outcomes 
because the potential success, as well as the actual realization of the expected synergies 
will surface after the deal closes. The integration phase is a complex task and in many 
cases insufficient integration was a major contributor to an M&A failure. Therefore, the 
organizational and cultural fit of the target should be considered and how those two 
different cultures and business models could be actively integrated, and integration 
should proceed quickly as competition will not stand  aside (Sudarsanam, 2010). 
Integration is the most critical stage where the potential of a deal could be spoiled, and 
the speed of the integration phase is often seen as a very important success driver and 
yet its importance is underestimated (Kummer & Steger, 2008). Change may be seen as 
easy and fast to achieve while reality proves the opposite in many occasions. In order 
for a change to occur and be deeply realized, a profound change in the whole 
organization's levels should take place and be strictly followed. Changes implemented 
during the very early beginning of the integrations are rather scratches on the surface 
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and the real transformational change will need tremendous efforts and following on to 
be profoundly realized (Abbas, Aroosh, Butt & Zafar, 2014; Kummer & Steger, 2008). 
It is clear that the due diligence, valuation, analysis and negotiation that precede cannot 
guarantee the success, as the synergies and assumptions that supported the decision to 
acquire a firm will be realized only if the acquirer effectively integrates that target. "A 
clear, strategic rationale for an acquisition is critical, but not enough to guarantee a 
successful deal and merger integration. The rationale helps to identify the right target 
and set boundaries for negotiations, but the hard work remains of bringing two 
companies together effectively" (Gadiesh, Ormiston, Rovit & Critchlow, 2001, p. 190). 
Unfortunately, many acquirers neglect the importance of planning the integration ahead 
and consequently either fail to integrate the target adequately or conduct the integration 
process too slowly (Venema, 2012). 
2.3. M&A Success and Failure 
The question of cross-border M&As success and constitutes the focus of this work. 
Domestic and cross-border M&As share the majority of motives, risks and success and 
failure factors. However, cross-border deals bear more uncertainty due to added 
elements like cultural and geographic differences, governance differences, currency, 
compensation policies and legal formalities (Erel et al., 2012; Rottig, 2007).  
This section will shed light on some of the findings of empirical studies that focused on 
M&As success and failure as well as its critical factors. 
Succeeding in M&A has never been an easy task. Gadiesh et al. (2001) revealed "it is 
calculated in several well-structured studies that  50-70% of the acquisitions actually 
destroy shareholder value instead of achieving cost and/or revenue benefits” (Gadiesh et 
al., 2001, p. 188). Companies spend more than $2 trillion on acquisitions annually, yet 
study after study indicate a failure rate of M&As somewhere between 70% and 90% 
(Christensen, Alton, Rising & Waldeck, 2011). Furthermore, studies suggest that cross-
border acquisitions perform worse than within borders with 83% more poor 
performance (Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005). 
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Evidence shows that while M&As bring positive short-term returns for shareholders of 
target firms, the long-run benefit to investors in acquiring firms is more questionable 
(Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006). Bruner (2002)  summarized 44 studies which focused 
on acquiring firm shareholders returns and the findings are presented in figure 4: 
Figure 4: Acquiring Firms' Returns 
 
Source: Adapted from (Bruner, 2002) 
 
Meeks (1977) in a study of  223 transactions between 1964 and 1971 in the United 
Kingdom found that two-thirds of acquirers performance were below the standards of 
industry in terms of changes in ROA (return on assets), cited by (Bruner, 2002). 
Nevertheless, and regardless of the low success rate of M&A and poor performance, 
companies still consider M&A as a viable and a popular mean towards rapid growth 
(Rottig, 2007). This emphasizes the importance of M&A as a corporate growth 
mechanism as well as an interesting research topic, and leaves significant future 
research opportunities toward better understanding of performance drivers and the 
complex paradox that M&A represents. 
Many direct and indirect reasons proved to be correlated with a deal's outcome. Bruner 
(2002) attributed failure to the following factors: 
Value 
Conservation
29%
Value Destruction
32%
Value Creation
39%
Acquiring Firms' Returns
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 Insufficient assessment of the target firm, which could lead to failure in 
capturing the desired synergies and the elements that made this deal viable in the 
first place; 
 Too much focus on the financial aspects of the deal; 
  Premium paid is too high as result of the pressure from the management to 
make something happen; 
 M&A as part of an outdated strategic plan; 
 Lack of experience in integration of the entities. 
Additionally, (Gadiesh et al., 2001) identifies five causes of failure, which are: 
 Poor understanding of the strategic levers; 
 Overpayment for the acquisition based on overestimation of enterprise value or 
overconfidence from management (hubris);  
 inadequate integration planning and execution; 
 A void in executive leadership and strategic communication; 
 Severe cultural mismatch. 
The motive behind a merger whether to diversify or to focus is of great significance to 
the outcomes. Diversification proves to destroy value and so the relatedness of the 
merging firms businesses seems to be positively associated with returns (Bruner, 2002). 
Maquieira, Megginson & Nail (1998) found negative but yet insignificant returns to 
buyers in conglomerate deals in comparison to positive and significant returns to buyers 
in non-conglomerate deals (Maquieira, Megginsonb & Nail, 1998). 
Moreover, payment method could contribute to the deal results. Cash-deals prove to 
have zero or slightly positive return on the announcement day in comparison to stock-
deals that have negative returns. Cash-deals appear to outperform stock-deals in terms 
of shareholders returns (Sudarsanam, 2010), as stock-deals might be seen as signal of 
overpriced shares of the acquirer (Bruner, 2002). However, in cash transactions, 
acquirer's shareholders take on the entire risk that the expected synergy value embedded 
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in the acquisition premium
1
 will not materialize. While in stock transactions, this risk is 
shared with the target shareholders (Rappaport & Sirower, 1999). 
Gomes et al (2013) emphasized the need to consider the interrelationship between 
variables and factors along the M&A process after identifying the success factors that 
relate to two dimensions of the process, the pre and post M&A, presented in table 3. 
Table 3: Pre- and Post-acquisition success factor 
Source: Adapted from (Gomes et al., 2013) 
After categorizing success factors within those two dimensions, pre and post merger, 
Gomes et al (2013) emphasized the necessity to understand and investigate the 
interrelationships between the pre and post M&A success factors towards a better M&A 
performance. Figure 5 presents the possible interrelationship between the pre and post 
M&A success factors (Gomes et al., 2013). 
                                                           
1 Acquisition premium: The difference between the estimated real value of a company and the actual 
price paid. 
 
Pre-merger success factors 
 
Post-merger success factor 
Choice and Evaluation of the Strategic 
Partner  
Integration Strategies 
Pay the Right Price 
 
Post Acquisition Leadership 
Size Mismatches and Organization 
 
Speed of Implementation 
Overall Strategy and Accumulated 
Experience on M&A  
Post-merger Integration Team and 
Disregard of Day-to-Day Business 
Activities 
Courtship 
 
Communication During Implementation 
Communication Before the Merger 
 
Managing Corporate and National 
Cultural Differences 
Future Compensation Policy 
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Figure 5: Summary of Pre- and Post-acquisition Phase-Critical Success Factors and 
Studies of Interrelationships 
 
Source: (Gomes et al., 2013) 
This framework represents the possible interrelationships between pre and post merger 
variables as a better understanding of this link could bring an improved M&A 
performance, as well as it is an attempt from authors to fill the lack of research about 
interrelationships between critical success variables in the pre and post merger phase 
(Gomes et al., 2013). 
A recent framework proposed by El Zuhairy, Taher & Shafei (2015), suggests the 
connection between motives and actions taken towards realization in an attempt to bring 
a successful execution of M&A, presented in figure 6. 
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Figure 6
2
 represents a framework that suggests the connectivity between motives and 
success factors related to each motive, as well as key success indicators the measure the 
achievements of those goals. Motives constitute the actual objectives for the 
management to achieve, success factors being management practices, actions and 
strategies to bring those objectives to realization, and key success indicators being the 
proper measures that represent the extent to what those objectives have been achieved 
(El Zuhairy et al., 2015). 
Realizing short-term goals in terms of integration is easy and generates quick wins. 
However, early wins could represent just 20% of all synergies since the ultimate success 
or failure of M&As comes in the later stages of integration (Kummer & Steger, 2008). 
Therefore, first steps in the M&A process could be easily done, but yet not enough to 
guarantee the long term success. 
While the later stage is more complex and will require more efforts towards a successful 
realization. During this stage the internal dynamic of the organization and people could 
be underestimated, as some resistance might show up and delay the realization of M&A. 
                                                           
2 Full version of the framework is provided in Annex 1. 
Motives Success Factors Key Success Indicators 
Motive 1 
Motive 2 
Motive 11 
Success factors 
relates to motive 1 
Success factors 
relates to motive 2 
Success factors 
relates to motive 11 
Key Success Indicators 
relates to motive 1 
Key Success Indicators 
relates to motive 1 
Key Success Indicators 
relates to motive 1 
Challenges 
Source: (El Zuhairy, Taher & Shafei, 2015) 
 
Figure 6: M&A Framework  
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In an attempt to explain the low success rate of M&As, Kummer & Steger (2008) 
presented what they called The Vicious Circle of Mergers and Acquisitions, as presented 
in figure7, trying to illustrate why an M&A failure happens and likely might continue 
reoccurring (Kummer & Steger, 2008). 
 
 
 
This circle shows the impact of the human aspect on the organizational behavior. The 
pressure to grow and overconfidence by executives and promoters (e.g., consultants, 
investment bankers) lead to unrealistic expectations about the speed. Ease and quick 
rewards of M&As might lead the company to commit to a new M&A as an only way 
and give it another try. With the possibility of and the decision to do, an M&A 
transaction produces reinforcing feelings. Successes might be realized, especially early 
Pressure (Internal/External) to realize growth 
Overconfidence of executives and promoters 
Unrealistic expectation about price, speed and 
other aspects  
Commitment to M&A as an only viable choice  
Point of no return: Decision for/against M&A 
transaction 
Resistance, especially during the post M&A 
integration  
Failure, External and internal attributions for 
failure  
Figure 7: The Vicious Circle of Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
Source: Adapted from (Kummer & Steger, 2008) 
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on in the integration process where goals are relatively easily met (the quick and easy 
wins). Unless there have been no mistakes made at this point, like choice of the wrong 
target or the payment of a too high premium, etc., the integration phase is where the 
“make or break” takes place and resistance shows up (Kummer & Steger, 2008). Failed 
M&As add more to the pressure to grow profitability causing the vicious circle to start 
all over again (Kummer & Steger, 2008). 
External factors like industry tends to have an impact on M&A outcomes, the following 
section will be dedicated to discuss this impact. 
2.3.1The impact of industry on M&A 
Industry has had a significant importance in shaping the M&A landscape especially 
when certain industry is heading towards consolidation which was the case for 
DaimlerChrysler merger, the selected case study for this dissertation. Therefore this 
section will discuss the impact of industry on M&As outcomes. 
M&As represent a prominent phenomenon of the developed capitalist world, growth of 
the company through M&A provides access to new markets and resources, and the 
success or failure is of great importance not only for the companies involved, but also 
for the overall economy (Herd & McManus, 2012). 
Internal organization variables such as strategy, structure and culture, management style 
and technology are typically pointed out as the most important variables that influence 
M&A success, while little or no attention is directed to industry structure as an external 
organizational variable on which company's long-term profitability depends. A study 
done by Accenture
3
 had emphasized the importance of industry structure on the success 
or failure of a M&A. Less concentrated industries tend to create more value from M&A 
transactions than heavily concentrated industries justifying by the fact that less 
concentrated industries tend to be less mature and less regulated than more concentrated 
industries making change easier to enact (Herd & McManus, 2012). 
                                                           
3 Accenture  is a multinational management consulting, technology services, and outsourcing company. It 
is the world's largest consulting firm as measured by revenues and is a Fortune Global 500 company . 
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Porter (1980) defines the industry as a group of companies that produce a range of 
products that are close substitutes as for example all companies who produce 
telecommunication equipments can be grouped in the same industry because they use 
the same raw materials and technology (Porter, 1980). 
Kandžija, Filipović & Kandžija (2014) in an attempt to identify the impact of industry 
structure on the target company's performance, have emphasized the necessity of 
defining terms such as industry and market. Although the concepts of industry and 
market have been identified, there is a difference between these two terms. "The 
industry can be seen as a group of companies that produce and sell similar products 
using the same technology, and that compete for production factors in the same markets, 
whereas markets can be viewed through geographical or product areas where the 
companies compete" (Wilson & Lipczynski, 2001). 
It is necessary to indicate that the market defines the place and manner of interfacing 
supply and demand in order to satisfy some needs, as well as all the actors involved in 
the process. In contrast, the industry does not consist of all the participants in the market 
(Kandžija, Filipović & Kandžija, 2014). 
Industry structure may range from a highly fragmented to a firmly consolidated 
industry. The fragmented industry is an industry with a large number of small or 
medium-sized enterprises, none of which is in a dominant position, nor does it have the 
power to shape the industry events (Porter, 1980). The consolidated industry is an 
industry dominated by one company or a small number of large companies. The main 
feature of this type of industry structure is the interdependence of companies, which is 
reflected by the fact that the actions of one company affect the profitability of others, as 
well as their market shares. The more concentrated the industry, the more likely it is for 
the companies in the industry to recognize their interdependence and therefore avoid 
strong rivalry that can reduce everyone‟s profitability (Kandžija et al., 2014). Kandžija 
et al. (2014, p. 22) in their research concluded that "the lower the concentration ratio of 
the target company's industry, the more successful is the target company's performance 
after the takeover". 
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Changes in industry structure pose a challenge for companies that operates in this 
industry to take extra efforts to preserve their competitive position, some of which react 
by undertaking takeovers, these takeovers themselves will lead to further structural 
changes that other firms may react to as a "me too" move (Sudarsanam, 2010).  
Given everything we have said before we can conclude that industry structure has an 
impact on M&A outcomes and it is necessary to analyze the ability and potential of this 
industry to create value from M&A. The more the growth potential or consolidation 
tendency of an industry, the more its potential to create value from M&A (Kandžija et 
al., 2014). Figure 8 represent the trends of the M&A growth by industry  (Delloite, 
2014): 
Figure 8: M&A sectors poised for growth 
 
Source: Adapted from M&A trends report 2014 (Delloite, 2014) 
2.3.2 Cultural Distance and M&A  
This section will be dedicated to an in-depth review of the literature that focused on 
culture as a determinant of M&As outcomes, on a domestic as well as cross border 
scope. Giving the fact that in the selected case study (DaimlerChrysler Merger), cultural 
mismanagement was a major driver for underperformance. 
As highlighted earlier, the integration phase seems to be the most critical phase of an 
M&A deal and the human impact is more visible at this stage and critically contributes 
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to the outcomes (Bruner, 2002; Gadiesh et al., 2001; Kummer & Steger, 2008; Rottig, 
2007; Stahl & Voigt, 2004; Venema, 2012). 
It is important to highlight the non-financial variables' impact on M&A success and 
failure in order to capture various dimensions that directly or indirectly influence M&A 
performance (Stahl & Voigt, 2004). Culture has emerged as one of the dominant factors 
that prevent or influence effective integrations (Delloite, 2009). 
Cultural distance, which is measured in terms of management style, business practices 
or work-related values and behaviors has a significant impact on processes such as 
choice of foreign market entry and the perceived ability to manage foreign operations, 
organizational learning and knowledge transfer, longevity of strategic alliances and 
cross-cultural effectiveness of expatriate managers (Ahammad, Tarba, Liu & Glaister; 
Stahl et al., 2013; Stahl & Voigt, 2004). 
In the M&A context, cultural differences can be a source of confusion and distrust 
between members of the merging firms. Two dimensions of culture are usually 
mentioned: national culture (which constitutes of values of a society encompassing 
languages, religions, traditions etc..) which is more relevant to international M&As, and 
organizational and corporate culture (defines as interdependent system of practices, 
norms, assumptions and beliefs that members of an organizations share) which is 
relevant for both domestic and international M&As (Rottig, 2007). Therefore, in 
international M&As, not only the corporate culture is different but also the national 
culture which poses higher risk in achieving fast and successful integration (Stahl & 
Voigt, 2004). International M&As remain the top list choice towards growth for 
multinationals, and yet up to 83 percent of such deals are unsuccessful (Moeller & 
Schlingemann, 2005). 
Regarding the relationship between cultural differences and M&A performance, the 
results of empirical research has led to inconclusive results. Some studies found 
negative impact of cultural distance on international M&A performance, others 
identified a positive impact, and yet others indicate a non-significant impact of cultural 
distance on performance. All of which leads to questioning the complexity of this 
relationship (Rottig, 2007). 
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As previously indicated, M&A can be part of a strategy of related or unrelated 
diversification, and consequently the level of integration highly differs. As in related 
M&As, higher degree of operational integration is required, cultural differences seem to 
have a higher impact. While unrelated M&As tend to require lower level of integration 
due to minimal interdependencies between the acquirer and the target businesses (Stahl 
& Voigt, 2004). M&A integration approaches depend on the required level of 
integration and the extent to which the own cultural identity is valued and the desire of 
autonomy is present. 
Recognition of multiple dimensions of culture might ease the integration process (Stahl 
& Voigt, 2004). Stahl & Voigt (2004) introduced in their integrative framework a 
conceptual split in the integration process, the task integration (value creation), 
measured in terms of capabilities transfers, resources and knowledge sharing, and the 
socio-culture integration, focusing on the human integration that lead to satisfaction, 
commitment and shared identity. 
Other authors studying domestic acquisitions suggested managing organizational 
cultures differences through the process of "acculturation" (Larsson & Lubatkin, 2001; 
Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988) which is " the outcome of a cooperative process 
whereby the beliefs, assumptions and values of two previously independent workforces 
form a jointly determined culture" (Larsson & Lubatkin, 2001, p. 1574). 
Nahavandi & Malekzadeh (1988) developed a conceptual model for acculturation 
process in M&A, consists of four modes as presented in table 4. 
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Table 4: Acculturation Modes 
Acculturation Modes 
Integration Assimilation Separation Deculturation 
Structural 
Assimilation of both 
cultures involved 
that, yet  preserves 
the identities and 
cultures of the 
acquirer and the 
target 
The acquired 
organization 
willingly relinquishes 
its culture and 
identity by adapting 
to the acquirer's 
culture 
Minimal cultural 
exchange between 
the acquirer and 
the targets that 
ensures both 
cultures remain 
completely 
separated 
Happens where members 
of the acquired 
organization do not value 
their own culture and 
organizational practices, 
and they refuse to be 
assimilated with the 
acquirer. Resulting in the 
acquired company to be 
disintegrated as a cultural 
entity 
Source: Adapted from (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988) 
 
The degree to what both acquirer and acquired firm agree on the mode of acculturation 
the more different cultures may be made compatible during the post-acquisition 
integration process, and that is the case where cultural differences may not necessarily 
lead to integration obstacles. On the other hand, the disagreement about the mode of 
acculturation between both entities may rise acculturative stress that may jeopardize the 
post-acquisition integration process (Rottig, 2007). Figure 9 and 10 represent the modes 
of acculturation for acquired firm and acquirer, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
Tarek ALDAOUD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 above represents the attitude of the acquired firm members towards the 
acquirer's culture taking into consideration to what degree the acquired members value 
the preservation of their own culture. While figure 10 represents the modes for 
acculturation that the acquirer will pursue considering the level of multiculturalism of 
the acquirer, as well as relatedness of businesses between acquirer and acquired. The 
How much do members of the acquired firm 
values preservation of their own culture? 
Integration  
Not at all Very much 
Assimilation   
Separation   Deculturation   
Very 
Attractive 
Not at all 
attractive 
Perception of 
attractiveness 
of the 
acquirer 
Figure 9: Acquired firm's modes of acculturation 
Source: Adapted from (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988) 
 
Culture: Degree of Multiculturalism 
Integration  
Unicultural Multicultural 
Assimilation   
Separation   Deculturation   
Related 
Unrelated 
Diversification 
Strategy: 
Degree of 
relatedness of 
firms 
Figure 10: Acquirer's modes of acculturation 
 
Source: Adapted from (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988) 
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more consensus about the acculturation approach the more chances for successful 
integration (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988). 
While the acculturation model was developed in the context of domestic M&As, 
international deals are often more complicated with different national cultures that 
embody stereotypes, prejudices and nationalism that may lead to conflicts and lack of 
trust and commitment (Olie, 1990), all of which imposes a higher challenge for 
integration and achieving consensus on an acculturation mode and suggests the limited 
applicability of acculturation model in international transactions (Rottig, 2007). Rotting 
(2007) suggested that "It is not cultural distance per se, but ineffective management of 
cultural differences may be the main reason for the high failure rate of international 
acquisitions" (Rottig, 2007). Therefore the question should be how to manage 
effectively cultural differences in an international context, rather than if cultural 
differences have a performance impact on M&As (Stahl & Voigt, 2004). 
Rotting (2005) introduced a descriptive framework, presented in figure 11, "The Five 
C's Framework" addresses the complex nature of cultural impact on international 
acquisitions performance, supporting the assumption that cultural differences may not 
necessarily represent a detrimental force impacting international acquisitions. Instead, 
poor management of the cultural combination process in the post-acquisition phase may 
be responsible for the large number of poorly performing cross-border acquisitions. 
 
Cultural Due 
Diligence 
Cross-cultural 
Communication 
Connection 
Control 
Combining 
Cultures 
Successfully 
International 
M&A 
performance 
Figure 11: Five C's Framework 
 
Source: Adapted from (Rottig, 2007) 
 
31 
Tarek ALDAOUD 
Combining the two cultures involved in an M&A occurs in the post-acquisition 
integration phase when those involved organization are forced to work together. And 
while in the pre-acquisition phase great effort is put to financial aspects during the due 
diligence, large number of acquirers fail to consider the importance of cultural analysis 
at this stage. Rotting (2007) in his framework, figure 11, indicated that cultural due 
diligence could be an effective tool towards analyzing the cultural compatibility in 
international M&As, giving the managers the opportunity of rethinking the chances of 
success for a deal when such a cultural due diligence indicates that the cultures of 
organizations are significantly incompatible, and therefore refraining the deal or 
developing a strategy where those different cultures can be best combined (Rottig, 
2007). 
Cross-cultural communication is an essential aspect throughout the transaction, and 
studies have emphasized the importance of communication on a domestic level during 
the post-acquisition integration process (Schweiger & Denisi, 1991). On an 
international level the importance of communication is even intensified. As in culturally 
and nationally distant organizations, and where prejudices and stereotypes are heavily 
present, lack of communication might be the reason why the involved workforces 
develop a hostile attitude preventing an effective integration process (Rottig, 2007). As 
acquisitions pose high level of uncertainty and fear, as layoffs for instance are often an 
inevitable, the management of the combined organizations should communicate its 
intention and strategy following the acquisition with the entire workforce. A two-way 
communication could ensure and facilitate that managers and employees are able to 
express their concerns and provide higher transparency and clarity, and might help 
diminish uncertainties and  increase employees identification within the new combined 
organization (Rottig, 2007). 
Furthermore, connection, representing the formal and informal channels of interaction 
within an organization is of importance for international M&As. As in addition to the 
structural formal channels, encouraging employees and managers of both organization 
to develop social ties and relations may facilitate the integration process (Rottig, 2007). 
Past studies found that relational and interpersonal networking facilitate the exchange of 
knowledge and information among foreign subsidiaries of multinationals which 
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contributes to a better connection between managers and employees (Ghoshal, Korine 
& Szulanski, 1994). This socialization may facilitate mutual understanding and 
appreciation of cultural differences, reinforcing connection between workforce of the 
acquirer and the acquired organization and will effectively contribute to a successful 
cultural combination (Rottig, 2007). 
An important aspect in international acquisitions is control, the perception of control 
and what types of control is applied seem to matter. For example the announcement of a 
merger as a "merger of equals" will create the expectation that power and control will 
be shared between the two combined organizations (Rottig, 2007). While " In reality, 
even when mergers are supposedly between relatively equal partners, most are in fact 
acquisitions with one company controlling the other " ("World Investment Report: 
Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions and Development," 2000). An example of 
announced as "mergers of equals" is the acquisition of Chrysler by Daimler-Benz and 
the takeover of Telekom Italia by Deutsche Telekom. The misconception of control, in 
deals announced as merger of equals and turned out to be an acquisition, will have an 
impact on acquired employees' confidence, commitment and cooperation with the 
acquirer toward a successful cultural combination. Therefore, acquirers should ensure 
that the acquired workforce understands the nature of the deal and consequently who is 
in control, and that does not mean that acquirers rely on dominant approaches of control 
rather than developing a type that will encourage creating common values, norms, 
beliefs and trust (Rottig, 2007). Larson & Lubatkin (2001) found that a successful 
acculturation in international acquisitions could be achieved through social controls, 
which are defined as the amount of socialization and coordination efforts taken by a 
foreign acquirer to ensure a successful cultural combination (Larsson & Lubatkin, 
2001). Larsson & Lubtikan (2001) indicated that “almost only one thing matters: 
involve the affected employees in such socializing activities as introduction programs, 
training, cross visits, joining retreats, celebrations and other socialization rituals and 
they are likely to create a joint organizational culture on their own volition, as long as 
they are allowed autonomy" (Larsson & Lubatkin, 2001, p. 1594). 
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2.4 M&A performance measures 
This section will discuss the various measures of M&A performance. Inconsistency is 
what seem to characterize some of the research findings when it comes to M&A 
performance, which could be justified by the various ways to measure performance 
(Meglio & Risberg, 2011). Some explained that as M&A is unique and complex 
phenomena, the findings are not comparable (Bower, 2001; Calori, Lubatkin & Very, 
1994). 
We can look at a deal from different perspectives, for instance increased growth and 
turnover, increased margins, what a deal can contribute to the balance sheet whether 
increase or decrease leverage, what this deal had contributed to the brand perception and 
sales, the firm competitive position in the market and whether it is on the track to 
dominate its market segment, bearing in mind that long term objectives take time to be 
apparent. Value related indicators is what grasp attention as the purpose of two 
companies marriage is to deliver market share growth and add value to shareholders, 
however, and even if M&A may be a quick way to bolster market share, it might not be 
the only best method to measure a deal's performance (Janicki, 2002). Motives behind 
the deal could indicate what measures should be used to track performance and to what 
extent the objectives have been realized. 
M&A performance is identified within two domains, financial and non-financial nature. 
The financial domain comprises market and accounting measures of performance. 
While the non-financial domain includes operational and overall performance measures. 
Each type of measures is reflected in different dimensions and key performance 
indicators. Meglio & Resiberg (2011) proposed a scheme, as shown in figure12, which 
categorizes M&A performance measures within the financial and non-financial domain. 
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Market performance measures indicate the changes in market value of the company 
whether on the announcement day or the closing date where the reaction of the market 
will be observed and reflected on the share price. However, market measures are 
available only for listed companies. Studies show that the acquirer in many cases 
receive negative or zero abnormal return while target share price shows positive 
abnormal return. One of the explanations is that when the merger creates value thanks to 
a good strategic and resources fit between the target and acquirer, the market allocates 
the full synergistic gains to the target shareholders, through the acquisition premium, 
rather than to the acquirer shareholders (Capron & Pistre, 2002; Meglio & Risberg, 
2011; Motis, 2007). 
Type of Measure 
Financial 
Domain 
Non-
Financial 
Domain 
Market 
Performance 
Accounting 
Performance 
Risk (e.g., Jensen's Alpha, Beta) 
Market Value (e.g., CAR, CAAR, 
RSH, APD, CPD) 
Profitability (e.g., ROA, ROI, ROS, 
Net Income 
Growth (e.g., Sales Growth) 
Leverage, Liquidity and Cash flow 
(e.g., Cash flow) 
Dimensions and Indicators 
Operational 
Performance 
Overall 
Performance 
Marketing (e.g., market Share) 
Innovation ( e.g., number of patents ) 
Productivity (e.g., Cost synergies) 
Success (e.g., Attainment of M&A 
goals) 
Survival (e.g., Divestiture) 
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Figure 12: classificatory scheme of M&A performance measures 
 
Source: (Meglio & Risberg, 2011) 
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While accounting measures are dependent upon financial information and records and 
expressed as values or ratios. One way to go for instance would be by comparing the 
financials of acquirers with non-acquirers based on industry and size of the firms in 
order to answer the question whether the acquirer outperformed their non-acquirer peers 
(Bruner, 2002; Meglio & Risberg, 2011; Motis, 2007). 
Non-financial measures are reflected in operational measure and overall performance 
measures. The operational performance can be measured by market share and power, 
innovation and novelty as well as productivity. While overall performance can be traced 
to the level of attainment of M&A goals and the wellbeing of the company in its 
respective market (Meglio & Risberg, 2011) 
Finally, it is important to understand what drives the firm value in a specific case as 
well as what was the goal behind a deal in the first place, whether it is cost reduction, 
increased revenues, new customers acquisition, higher market share or new market 
entry in order to identify what measures could be suitable to evaluate post-acquisition 
performance.  
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3. Methodology 
This chapter aims at presenting the research's goal and methodology, starting by the 
research goals in section (3.1) and the research methodology in section (3.2), namely 
case study approach (3.2.1), the selected case (3.2.2), data collection (3.2.3) and 
analysis techniques (3.2.4). 
3.1 Research Goals and Focus 
As the literature review has indicated, M&A activities have witnessed a significant rise 
triggered by globalization. However, success rate is considerably low (Bruner, 2002; 
Christensen et al., 2011; Gadiesh et al., 2001). Internationally, M&As have increased 
from 23% of total mergers volumes in 1998 to 45% in 2007 (Erel et al., 2012), 
nonetheless up to 83% of those transactions underperformed (KPMG, 1999; Moeller 
and Schlingemann, 2005; Sirower, 1997) cited by (Rottig, 2007). 
Cross-border M&As seem to represent an unexplained paradox and despite the low 
success rate, it is still a popular mechanism for corporations that are looking for global 
reach (Rottig, 2007). Therefore, in light of the literature review that has discussed the 
motives of M&As, the mechanism of M&A process as well as the related success 
factors, indicators and variables, and by using an international M&A case, this 
dissertation will aim at investigating, analyzing and understanding the mechanism of 
this M&A transaction and its outcomes to answer the following questions: 
1. What are the motives behind M&A as a foreign expansion strategy? 
2. What are the factors and challenges towards achieving a successful integration? 
3. What performance measures can reflect the achievements of the objectives? 
To pursue the research goals, Figure 13 simplifies the flow of the case analysis. Starting 
by attribution of external factors like industry which is likely to reinforce consideration 
of M&A, towards more detailed analysis of the motives, the actions and integration 
plans and their relatedness to the initial motives, and finishing by the performance 
evaluation. 
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3.2 Research Methodology 
3.2.1 Case Study Approach  
In an M&A context, the literature has provided different approaches to evaluate M&A 
outcomes depending on the targeted indicators: 
a- Event Studies: which examines the abnormal returns 4  to shareholders 
surrounding the announcement of the transaction, where the reaction of the 
market to this announcement will be observed and reflected on the share price. 
                                                           
4  Abnormal returns are the actual returns in excess to the normal returns that those shareholders might 
have received except for the takeover event (Sudarsanam, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
Competition  
Industry  
Mutual motives 
towards considering 
M&A 
Company A 
Company B 
Factors that facilitate a successful  M&A 
and factors that hinder 
Performance evaluation 
Key Performance measures that fit the 
evaluation criteria and reflect the attainment of 
M&A objectives 
Integration challenges 
Figure 13: Analysis framework 
Source: Own figure and Adapted from (El Zuhairy et al., 2015) 
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As mentioned earlier, studies have shown that acquirer in many cases receive 
negative or zero abnormal return while target share price shows positive 
abnormal return (Capron & Pistre, 2002; Motis, 2007). 
b- Accounting Studies: the examination of the financial outcomes of the acquirer 
before and after the acquisition to determine the changes in financial 
performance, and to be compared to benchmarks which are firms that match on 
the basis of size and industry and who made no acquisitions (Bruner, 2002; 
Motis, 2007). 
c- Surveys of executives: simply by asking managers whether an acquisition has 
created value (Bruner, 2002). 
d- Clinical studies (Case studies): the focus on small sample of transactions in a 
greater depth. They offer a deeper insights on the returns and implications of the 
deal and provide a thorough understanding of a specific deal outcomes and its 
value drivers, as well as a possibility to find a connection between the literature 
and that specific sample (Motis, 2007). 
In this dissertation, case study approach will be used for the investigation of an 
international M&A transaction's outcomes and its surrounded factors. In light of the 
literature review which has provided a theoretical understanding of the subject in 
question, the analysis of a case study will help investigating a contemporary 
phenomenon like M&A on a deeper level and within a real-life context (Yin, 2009). 
Case study approach allows researchers to reach high levels of "Conceptual Validity", 
as to identify and measure indicators that best represent the theoretical concepts of the 
researched topic (George & Bennett, 2005). 
George & Bennett (2007) define a case as "an instant of a class of events". The term 
class here refers to a phenomenon of scientific interest. In this dissertation, the case 
study approach will be used to gain an in depth knowledge about an international M&A 
deal and the factors that contributed to its outcome, as well as the proper indicators that 
could represent its performance at best. 
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3.2.2 Case Selection 
In a case study approach, the selected case is required to represent the research criteria 
on a wide broad (Perry, 1998). In this dissertation, the selected case is Daimler-Chrysler 
merger, occurred in 1998. This case represents an international transaction and one of 
the largest mergers at the time involving two global players in the automobile industry. 
Globalization and the tendency of the automobile industry towards consolidation were 
major forces that were pushing the companies to explore the opportunity, develop their 
presence on an international scope and consequently increase their market share. For 
these reasons, we believe that this case study fits the goals of the study. Namely it 
enables the identification of the motives and factors that surrounded Daimler-Chrysler 
deal, the analysis of the integration process and the outcome of this merger through the 
theoretical framework drawn from the literature review. 
3.2.3 Data Collection  
Evidence in case study research could be gathered from many sources like documents, 
archival records, interviews, observations and artifacts (Yin, 2009). Data in the research 
community is classified as either primary or secondary data. Primary data is information 
gathered by the researcher on his own by using interviews, questionnaires and tests, 
while secondary data is data collected by other researchers or institutions and which 
could be found in literature, documents, books and scientific articles (Bryman & Bell, 
2011). 
In this dissertation secondary data which is documents of all types such as articles, 
financial data sources, company reports, case studies and others will be used. 
3.2.4 Data Analysis 
The reviewed literature has provided a theoretical understanding of the M&A as 
corporate mechanism for growth, as well as an area of academic research. In order to 
reach the research goal which is fundamentally understanding and analyzing the 
outcomes of an international M&A transaction taking into account all the surrounding 
factors that mutually led to the failure of the selected case study (DaimlerChrysler 
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1988), And consequently finding the connection between the reviewed literature and its 
applicability on the selected case. 
And as a research technique and following the analysis framework (figure 13), I will 
make use of the M&A framework, figure 6 (section 2.3), which aims at providing 
managers with practical tool that intends to ease the management of an M&A 
transaction and optimize performance, in order to understand motives behind the deal 
and their relatedness if existed to action plans that took place towards bringing those 
objectives to realization. Afterwards key performance indicators will reflect the 
attainment of the deal objectives. And towards performance measurement, figure 12 
(section 2.4) provides key performance indicators for M&A performance that are 
categorized according to the to the targeted evaluation criteria.  
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4. Case Study: Daimler-Chrysler Merger 
This chapter will constitute the analysis of DaimlerChrysler merger. Starting by brief 
profiling of Daimler and Chrysler (section 4.1), followed by the analysis of this case in 
light of the proposed research questions and framework (section 4.2) which will provide 
the analysis of the motives behind DaimlerChrysler merger to investigate the strategic 
fit and alignment of those motives with the overall strategy of both involved firms 
(section 4.2.1), the analysis of the surrounding factors and events and their impact on 
the outcomes of this merger (section 4.2.2), performance meaurement(section 4.2.3) 
discussion of the case analysis and results (section 4.3) and conclusion (section4.4). 
4.1 Brief overview of both companies before the merger 
Chrysler Corporation, founded in the US 1925 by Walter Chrysler. It is one of the "three 
big" American automobile manufacturers, known for its risk-taking strategy. Chrysler 
survived the edge of facing banruptcy more than once after the Second World War. 
In the mid-1990s, Chrysler Corporation was the most profitable automotive producer in 
the world. Its U.S. market share climbed to 23% in 1997. Chrysler was categorized as 
highly innovative and leader in product development and design. Chrysler operated in 
two principal segments: Automotive Operations and Financial Services (Blas̆ko et al ., 
2000; Finkelstein, 2002; Jean & Cohen, 2000). 
Daimler-Benz AG, a world class automotive company with the finest of German 
manufacturing and engineering quality. Known primarily for its luxury Mercedes-Benz 
as its iconic symbol of quality and global reach. Daimler-Benz was the largest industrial 
group in Germany with $68.9 billion in revenues in 1997. 
Its history is rooted to 1886 to its visionary founders Gottlieb Daimler and Carl Benz, 
Daimler-Benz AG was officially founded in 1926. Daimler operated in four business 
segments: Automotive, Aerospace, Services, and Directly Managed Businesses (Blas̆ko 
et al., 2000; Finkelstein, 2002; Jean & Cohen, 2000). 
Both companies were in a booming position and looking for a stronger global reach. On 
January 12, 1998, Jurgen Schrump, Chairman of Daimler Benz Management Borad 
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visited Robert Eaton, Chairman and CEO of Chrysler Corporation at an international 
Auto Show and discussed the possibility of a merger, less than four months later, a 
merger agreement was signed (Blas̆ko et al., 2000). 
4.2 Case Analysis 
To perform the analysis of this case in light of the proposed research questions and 
framework, the motives behind DaimlerChrysler merger will be critically analyzed, 
followed by the analysis of the surrounding factors, the post-merger integration and key 
performance indicators that reflect the financial outcomes of the deal. 
4.2.1 The motivations for DaimlerChrysler Merger 
The mid90s were a hard period in the car industry mainly due to overcapacities, to a 
strengthened position of customers and to an increased enviromental conciousness. The 
industry's tendancy towards consolidation started to apprear in the auto industry, figure 
14 shows the increase in M&A activities in automobile industry late between 1985 and 
2015. Chrysler and Daimler Benz seemed to be a promising match with high potentail 
synergies (Hollmann et al., 2010). 
Figure 14: M&A deals in value and number of transactions in the automobile industry 
 
Source: Institute of Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances (http://www.imaa-institute.org) 
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May 7,1998, was the day that witnessed the combination of two global automakers in 
one of the largest international indestrial merger in history. Announced as "merger of 
equals". Daimlerr merger with Chrysler was regarded to shape the future of the auto 
industry and to trigger consolidation within this industry (Blas̆ko et al ., 2000). For 
starters, such a large transaction on an international level was to face higher risks and 
challenges, given the differences in corporate and national cultures, currency, 
compensation plolicies, ownership structure and legal environment (Blas̆ko et al ., 
2000). 
The deal was greatly promising with both companies looking forward to a stronger 
global reach and perfect complementarity and strategic fit. As Jurgen Schrumpp stated 
in London at a press conference while announcing the merger, "This is much more than 
a merger, today we are creating the world‟s leading automotive company for the 21st 
century. We are combining the two most innovative car companies in the world" (Jean 
& Cohen, 2000). 
Robert Eaton added that “Both companies have product ranges with world class brands 
that complement each other perfectly. We will continue to maintain the current brands 
and their distinct identities” (“Merger agreement signed,” Canada Newswire, May 7, 
1998) cited by (Blas̆ko et al., 2000). 
As the literature has showed, the primary motivation for M&A is the quest for rapid 
growth (Kummer & Steger, 2008). Daimler sales in Europe represent 63% of total sales, 
while Chrysler depends highly on North America where 93% of sales are realized. Both 
companies were trying to expand geographically, and immediate growth opportunities 
would exist by using each other's facilities, capacities and infrastructure (Blas̆ko et al ., 
2000). 
With $2.8 billion in annual profits, remarkable efficiency, low design costs and 
extensive American dealership network, Chrysler appeared to be a perfect fit for 
Daimler-Benz who was looking for a partner to have a bigger share of the American 
market (Finkelstein, 2002). 
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There were various reasons that made DaimlerChrysler an appealing and promising 
strategy for both companies' shareholder and the industry as a whole (Blas̆ko et al ., 
2000; DaimlerChrysler, 1998; Finkelstein, 2002; Jean & Cohen, 2000): 
1- The tendency that the automotive industry will experience significant 
consolidation, resulting in a smaller number of larger companies. 
2- Both companies strategic and complementarity fit, Daimler-Benz being a leader 
in luxury and high end cars and Chrysler being strong in sport vehicles and 
minivans. Daimler's stronger presence in Europe and Chrysler in North America. 
Moreover Daimler's reputation for engineering and Chrysler's reputation for 
product development and innovation, all of which framed significant strong 
strategic fit and complementarity for both companies. 
3- Potential synergies arise from high cost efficiency and shared technologies, 
distribution channels, purchasing, R&D, and know-how. Both companies 
promised to deliver synergies totaling $1.4 billion in 1999 and more than $3 
billion by 2000. Table 5 indicates areas where synergies were expected. 
Table 5: Synergies expected of unification (in millions of US $, at 1.78DM/$1) 
 For 1999 By 2001 
Purchasing $506 $1,517 
Integration/Financial Services $202 $506 
R&D Platforms $101 $506 
Sales Increase $303 $786 
Distribution/Dealership $303 $303 
Total $1,415 $3,618 
Source: DaimlerChrysler Unification Report/ www.Autointell.com 
4- Strengthened competitive position through geographic expansion for both 
companies. 
5- Reduced risk for Daimler which is associated with its high dependency on the 
premium segment of automobile market. 
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6- Enhanced liquidity by creating the third largest automobile company in the 
world in terms of revenues, market capitalization and earnings. 
7- The potential long-term synergies in development and growth of markets. 
Nevertheless, and despite the perfect fit that this deal has proposed, several potential 
risks were outlined (Blas̆ko et al., 2000): 
1- The difficulties in integrating two large companies with distant national and 
corporate cultures and geographically dispersed operations. 
2- Expected synergies might not be fully achieved. 
3- Different legal environment and legislations. 
4- Uncertainty regarding the long-term performance. 
5- Potential agency conflicts. 
4.2.2 DaimlerChrysler Merger and Post-Merger Integration 
DaimlerChrysler was announced as "merger of equals", noticeably no merger has ever 
happened. That was apparent due to few signals that indicated the nature of this deal to 
be an acquisition of Chrysler by Daimler-Benz (Blas̆ko et al., 2000; Finkelstein, 2002): 
1- A premium was paid to Chrysler which is atypical in merger of equals. Chrysler 
shareholders received a premium of 31% over the closing prices of their shares 
(annex 2 explains the shares' exchange rate). 
2- A 30.9% abnormal return upon announcement for Chrysler's shares, reflecting 
the market reaction and expectation of this deal and the premium paid, while 
Daimler-Benz shares realized a positive return of 4.6%. 
3- Daimler-Benz dominated the combined organization board of management, in 
less than a year DaimlerChrysler board of management consisted of nine former 
managers of Daimler and only five of Chrysler, and three years after the deal the 
representatives of Chrysler decreased to two. 
In an interview with the Financial Times at the end of October 2000, Jurgen Schrempp 
stated he had never intended a merger of equals but instead always aimed to acquire 
Chrysler. 
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This unbalanced control and power which contradicted the expectation of a "merger of 
equals" deal will have a significant impact along the integration process adding more 
challenges to what it already has (Finkelstein, 2002). Stating clearly via the German 
financial daily Handelsblatt, "The merger of equals statement was necessary in order to 
earn the support of Chrysler's workers and the American public, but it was never 
reality" (Handelsblatt. Frankfurt, Germany, (10/30/00), p. 3) cited by (Finkelstein, 
2002). 
Nevertheless, the deal showed a great potential and the market had positive expectations 
about the deal, giving the positive abnormal return, as well as the combined market 
capitalization being $95.2 billion at the close of NYSE trading on 7
th
 May, 1998, which 
is $10.2 billion greater than the combined market value of both firms before the 
announcement of the merger (Blas̆ko et al., 2000). 
DaimlerChrysler was regarded to be the first automotive company with a genuinely 
global ownership structure at the time of the merger, stockholders were located equally 
in the US (44%) and Europe (44%), with German stockholders holding 37% of the 
shares. 
Following the merger there were some major events that seemed to have an impact on 
the merged entity (Blas̆ko et al., 2000), a brief of those events will follow: 
1- October 1998, the decision of Standard & Poor not to include DaimlerChrysler 
in the S&P 500 index, justifying their decision that "It‟s a German company, it 
pays taxes in Germany, it‟s incorporated in Germany. Our long-standing policy 
is that non-U.S. companies will not be added to the S&P U.S. indexes" (Blas̆ko 
et al., 2000). The market reaction was negative and Chrysler shares suffered an 
abnormal return of -14.6% on the announcement day. And as a consequence the 
DaimlerChrysler shareholders in the US fell to 25% by March 1999. 
2- The rumored merger with Nissan while DaimlerChrysler was searching for a 
suitable partner to expand the Asian operations. Consequently DaimlerChrysler 
shares (DCX) fell by 6%, till an official announcement of "no merger" was made 
giving an abnormal return to DCX by 5%. That would be explained that the 
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market seem to think of that move as a bad idea giving the troubled case of 
Nissan at the time (Vlasic & Stertz, 2000). 
3- The departure of 7 key executives and engineers of Chrysler between 1998 and 
1999, indicating more and more the cultural clash and integration obstacles 
which led to loss of key assets on the management level. Jurgen Schrempp when 
asked about the defection at a news conference in Stuttgart, he said " we don't 
need their know-how, you can quote me" (Blas̆ko et al., 2000). 
This merger seemed to be in favor of both companies and aligned with their strategy 
towards a global reach, strategically and financially fit, significant potential synergies 
and growth opportunities, moreover, the market seemed to be in favor of this deal. 
However, the challenges to integrate such large corporations would require tremendous 
efforts to bring two entities with a very distant corporate and national culture into one 
functional entity which could bring these synergies to realization. 
As several studies showed, organizational culture and behavior tend to rooted and 
influenced by the nation's culture, and sometimes it may differ within the same nation. 
In a cross-border M&A context like this case, values, principles and norms are 
fundamentally different giving the distant countries where these two companies 
belonged (Hollmann et al., 2010). A brief comparison of both cultures will follow, 
United States of America is known as a nation of diversity or as called a "melting pot" 
and diversity management seems to play a role in the corporate world. Americans are 
individualistic, pragmatic and goal oriented as what matters are the results, not how 
those results are delivered. Equality and small power distance is what characterize the 
Americans, with willingness to take risks and show more flexibility (Hollmann et al., 
2010). On the other hand, the German shows higher power distance, and hierarchy plays 
a role in the organizational model. Less individualistic and more risk averse and 
consequently avoidance of novelties (Hollmann et al., 2010). In light of that the merger 
was seen as "marriage of opposites". Daimler embraced formality, hierarchy and 
structured decision making, while Chrysler promoted cross-functional teams and free 
form discussion. German executives spoke English while none of the Americans spoke 
German (Jean & Cohen, 2000). Moreover the organizational structure was an issue as 
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Chrysler operated more as a strategic business unit, while Daimler had more of a 
traditional structure with autonomy of its 23 business units. 
Regarding the management structure, Jurgen Schrumpp and Robert Eaton were to be 
Co-Chairmen and Co-CEOs for the new entity. DaimlerChrysler was required under the 
German law to have a board of management and a supervisory board. The board of 
management consisted of sixteen members, eight of Chrysler and eight of Daimler 
Benz. The supervisory board comprised of ten shareholders' representatives and ten 
employees' representatives, five members of the supervisory board of Daimler Benz and 
five member of Chrysler board of directors formed the new supervisory board. Thomas 
Stallkamp, president of Chrysler from January 1998 and in charge of the integration 
once commented " All 420,000 employees need to know we've left Chrysler behind and 
we've left Daimler Benz behind, we will all be working for new company" (Jean & 
Cohen, 2000). 
The difference in the compensation schemes was obvious with Eton paid at a high CEO 
rate with stock options, and Schrempp at much lower German salary. Furthermore 
Chrysler executive had a very rich termination contracts (golden parachutes), a practice 
was not used in Germany (Blas̆ko et al., 2000; Jean & Cohen, 2000). 
The success of this deal would essentially depend on the management's ability to create 
single corporate culture and to get both workforce to see the benefits of operating in a 
new way where both brands could stand out and synergies could be achieved (Jean & 
Cohen, 2000). And as the literature proved, managing cultural distance is one of the 
major obstacles to overcome in the context of M&A and it can highly jeopardize the 
future of a deal, and DaimlerChrysler was no exception. Paul Ballew, Chief Economist 
at J.D. Power asserted that "the greatest challenge of any major merger is the culture. It 
probably will or should be the number one topic on their agenda for the next 3-5 years" 
(Jean & Cohen, 2000). 
The early stages of integration emphasized the necessity to identify a best way that this 
new company can adopt. However, and instead of embracing each other strengths and 
trying to formulate a common ground and best fit process that can be built on the best of 
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both companies, both sides were trying to prove their system as a best way wasting time 
and resources and slowing the integration process (Jean & Cohen, 2000). 
The brand identity became a debate, as Germans regarded their iconic Mercedes as 
associated with luxurious and high end car and somehow superior to those from 
Chrysler. For instance, Mercedes Chief Juergen Hubbert once commented "Would 
never drive a Chrysler". And with such words among others, the tension, disconnection 
and distrust started to run deeper internally highlighting more and more the challenge 
bringing these two companies together (Finkelstein, 2002). 
Moreover, financial reporting and investor relations brought another debate. Chrysler 
over the years had established itself as a world-class benchmark with high recognition 
from the US business community, and surviving bankruptcy more than once has led 
Chrysler to disciplined cash management approach. While Daimler started reporting 
according to the US GAAP in 1995, it was still developing especially in the cash 
management function, for example the difficulty to trace cash to its resources and uses 
for Daimler's business units as all cash was pooled. Moreover, Chrysler had skillful 
expertise with the investment community dealing with analysts, Wall Street and 
institutional investors, contrary to Daimler approach with only reporting the required 
numbers, all of which added more heated debates to the conflict leading Jurgen 
Schrempp to declare once that "he wouldn't bother with trying to please young, 
immature MBA analysts" (Jean & Cohen, 2000). 
On an operational level, Daimler remained committed to its philosophy "quality at any 
cost", while Chrysler aimed at producing price-targeted vehicles, which resulted in a 
fundamental disconnect in supply-procurement tactics and reassuring the brand image 
clash with Chrysler as an American risk-taking status and controlled-cost atmosphere, 
and Daimler the disciplined German engineering and uncompromised quality. And due 
to a brand bias, Mercedes Benz dealers for instance refused to include Chrysler vehicles 
in their offering, keeping distribution and retailing largely separate (Finkelstein, 2002). 
The imbalanced power contradicting the expected characteristics of a "merger of 
equals" made it hard to enact change. The Germans dominated the management scene 
after Robert Eaton has left the company leaving the leadership to his German 
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counterpart. Late 2000, James Holden, who had been appointed CEO of Chrysler after 
the acquisition, was replaced by the German Dieter Zetsche, shifting the leadership of 
Chrysler division to the German management and making it more and more apparent 
that this deal was never a "merger of equals". One of Dieter Zetsche‟s first decisions as 
the new CEO of Chrysler concerned a layoff of 26,000 Chrysler employees, which 
consequently created more skepticism, distrust, feelings of insecurity among Chrysler 
employees and their future in this company (Finkelstein, 2002). This cultural clash and 
continuous disconnection on the management level as well as on the operational level 
doomed this promising deal to failure and decreased any possibility of synergies 
realization. All ended up by Cerberus Capital Management, a private equity firm, 
buying 80.1% stake in Chrysler for $7.4 billion (FinancialTimes, 2007). 
4.2.3 Performance measurement 
DaimlerChrysler merger failed on many scales. The merger objectives were not 
attained, loss of competencies with departure of key executives from Chrysler, 
disconnection between the two combined business on management and operational 
levels, decreased market value and profitability, ending the merger with the sale of 
80.1% of Chrysler for 7.4 $ billion (FinancialTimes, 2007), compared to Chrysler 
market value at 26.8$ one day before the announcement (Blas̆ko et al., 2000). Some key 
performance measures can reflect the financial outcomes of DaimlerChrysler merger. 
Market value: 
Figure 15 shows the decrease in market cap. The joint market capitalization after the 
announcement of the merger was 95.2 $ billion (85.76 € billion) compared to the market 
value of Daimler 58.1 $ billion (52.43 € billion) and Chrysler 26.8 $ billion (24.14 € 
billion) one day before the announcement (Blas̆ko et al ., 2000). May 2007, 80.1% of 
Chrysler shares were acquired by Cerberus Capital Management for 7.4 $ billion, 
indicating market value of Chrysler at 9.24 $ billion.  
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Figure 15: Market capitalization 
 
Source: DaimlerChrysler's annual reports between 1988-2006/ (http://www.daimler.com/investor-
relations/reports-and-key-figures/reports) 
Additionally, figure 16 illustrates the decrease of DaimlerChrysler's share price. 
Figure 16: DaimlerChrysler Share Price 
 
Source: DaimlerChrysler's annual reports between 1988-2006 (http://www.daimler.com/investor-
relations/reports-and-key-figures/reports) 
Profitability: 
Figure 17 represents the operating profits and net income of DaimlerChrysler from 1998 
up to 2006, with losses in 2001 mostly originated by Chrysler division as the annual 
report shows. 
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Figure 17: Net income and operating profits between 1998-2006 
 
Source: DaimlerChrysler Annual reports between 1988-2006/ (http://www.daimler.com/investor-
relations/reports-and-key-figures/reports) 
While figure 18 shows the changes in EPS (Earnings per share). 
Figure 18: Earnings per share for DaimlerChrysler  
 
Source: DaimlerChrysler Annual reports between 1988-2006/ (http://www.daimler.com/investor-
relations/reports-and-key-figures/reports) 
The impact of currency difference could be seen in annual reports as exchange rate 
didn't show high stability, figure 19 shows the fluctuation of the euro-dollar exchange 
rate. 
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 Figure 19: Euro-Dollar Exchange rate 1998-2006  
 
Source: DaimlerChrysler Annual reports between 1988-2006/ http://www.daimler.com/investor-
relations/reports-and-key-figures/reports 
The preceded indicators can illustrate the poor financial performance and the loss of 
value during the merger life. 
4.3 Discussion of the case 
Starting by the industry, as the literature indicated (section 2.3.1), the more the growth 
potential and tendency of the industry towards consolidation the higher its potential to 
create value from M&A (Kandžija et al., 2014). And that was the case in the automobile 
industry at the time of the merger which would justify the decision of Daimler-Benz and 
Chrysler for considering M&A towards market share growth and global reach. 
Moreover, Motives behind this transaction relate positively to both companies' vision 
and growth strategy and indicate a significant strategic fit. All of which would frame 
this deal as the perfect strategy to adopt. 
However and what seemed to be underestimated or maybe neglected was the impact of 
the dispersed and distant cultures as well as the organization structure and mechanism. 
In other words both organizations have nothing in common in terms of corporate and 
national culture, brand image, compensation schemes and legal formalities (Blas̆ko et 
al., 2000; Finkelstein, 2002; Jean & Cohen, 2000). The mismanagement of this cultural 
clash rather that the cultural differences themselves might be what had jeopardized the 
potential of this deal(Rottig, 2007), creating a void between what should have been 
done towards goals realization and what was actually done taking into consideration the 
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events like the decision of S&P 500 not to include DaimlerChrysler in their index and 
the departure of key executives of Chrysler leading Daimler to continuously take over 
the management. All of which had led DaimlerChrysler to underperform and delay 
synergies realization and what supposed to bring positive financial synergies ended up 
with significant decrease in market value and profitability as the analysis showed. 
As the M&A framework (figure 6) has suggested, specific related success factors (being 
the actions and implementation plans from management which need to be aligned with 
the motives) had to take place in order to bring motives into actual realization (El 
Zuhairy et al., 2015) which contradict what was done here as explained in the following. 
 Towards bringing the financial synergies into place: 
 
 Towards capitalizing on integration: 
 
The rapid required integration towards a highly integrated merged entity and 
consequently value creation mechanism 
What was actually done towards 
that: 
 Both sides were trying to prove their system as a best way instead 
of seeking one best way 
 Continued disconnection between both brands 
 Chrysler operated as a strategic business unit, while Daimler had 
a traditional structure with autonomy of its 23 business units 
Financial Synergies as Cost efficiency, shared controlled-cost product 
development, innovation and distribution channels 
What was actually done towards 
that: 
 Daimler preserved their philosophy " quality at any cost" neglecting the 
benefits of Chrysler model in priced-targeted product development 
 Distribution channels and brand offering remained disconnected 
 Differences in financial reporting remained unsettled 
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 Towards higher integration on the management level and consequently an 
efficient management of the cultural clash: 
 
we can conclude that the management practices towards a successful transaction were 
not exactly in accordance with what the M&A framework (figure 6) has suggested, 
which could be an evidence about the link between motives and their related success 
factors. 
4.4 Conclusion 
In light of the events that followed DaimlerChrysler deal, and the factors surrounding 
the 10-years life of this, failure seemed to be inevitable. From a strategic and long-term 
perspective, the deal was promising with high potential and significant expected 
synergies, both companies perfectly complementing each other's strategy in foreign 
market expansion, cost saving, technology and product development. Additionally, both 
companies were among leaders in their respective market with long history of success. 
However, once the deal closed, the critical part was to effectively integrate these two 
culturally and geographically distant business entities to function as a new global 
company. 
Bringing the  two companies who are geographically and culturally distant with 
a different organizational structure towards one integrated global company  
What was actually done towards 
that: 
 Daimler gained more power on the management level and 
contradicting the characteristic of the deal as a merger of equals 
 Different compensation schemes remained unsettled 
 Different operational mechanisms remained in place 
 Departure of key executive from Chrysler causing tension among 
Chrysler workforce and shifting more management power to 
Daimler 
 Poor management of cultural differences slowing the integration 
and triggering underperformance 
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Cultural clash was a major contributor for the DaimlerChrysler underperformance. 
However, management practices, the internal conflict and disconnection between both 
workforce that led to compromised decisions about what best to be done for the new 
company, also played a role in the failure of this deal 
The announcement of the deal as a "merger of equals" which turned out not to be the 
case, has led both sides to misunderstand and probably mismanage the situation, which 
consequently had a share in cracking the deal outcomes. Bud Liebler, head of Chrysler 
marketing, once said, ''We should have never called this a 'merger of equals' '', ''It was 
an acquisition, and by calling it something else, we confused a lot of people on both 
sides of the Atlantic.'' (Vlasic & Stertz, 2000). 
Thomas Stallkamp, in charge of integration at the time, had thrived to take what is best 
from both companies and what makes them both leaders in their respective market and 
combine those strength into one new global company, But the disconnection between 
management made it hard to effectively manage and enact change. 
Decreased market capitalization and continuous operational losses made it inevitable 
that an action is needed to avoid the worst (for instance the bankruptcy of both 
companies), outing an end of the largest cross border M&A at the time with the sale of 
Chrysler to Cerberus Capital Management. 
The problem, as the events had showed was not a wrong choice of a partner. 
Strategically both companies complemented what the other was looking for on a long 
term, global reach and expansion, acting upon the changes that were happening in the 
automobile industry, stronger competitive position and significant potential synergies, 
all of which gave this deal validity and approval of both companies' leaders as well as 
the market. The management of the cultural and organizational differences was the 
"make or break" for DaimlerChrysler to bring those synergies to realization, as Rotting 
(2007) argued that it is not the cultural differences that might jeopardize an M&A 
potential, rather than being the poor and mismanagement of cultural combination 
process in the post acquisition stage (Rottig, 2007). 
The expectations that this deal would be a "merger of equals", which would have meant 
a balanced and distributed control and power between both companies, the perception of 
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that by Chrysler employees that they are an equal partner and the fact that Daimler 
gradually imposed their management and culture along the process, led to skepticism of 
the workforce. These facts together with ambiguity about the future of the company 
were major contributors for the underperformance of the new merged company that 
made the objectives of the merger impossible to realize. These facts are consistent with 
Rotting (2007) argument that it is not the cultural differences that might jeopardize an 
M&A deal, rather than being the poor and mismanagement of cultural combination 
process in the post-acquisition stage. 
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5. Conclusions, Limitations and Future Research 
5.1 Conclusions 
This work aimed at investigating the context of M&A activities as a strategic and 
growth mechanism. Literature review was presented to bring a better understanding of 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as part of corporations strategy. The motives that lead 
a company to consider an M&A and the success and failure of M&A considering 
different performance measures was followed by the analysis of a case study. 
As the literature has shown, the complexity of M&A requires continuous investigation. 
Every deal is unique and impacted by external forces like economy, industry, rivalry, 
customers' changing tastes and the ease of losing their royalties in addition to internal 
dynamics like organization's culture, efficient and reliable change management and 
leaders (Kummer & Steger, 2008). 
And from what the case of DaimlerChrysler showed and in relation to the research 
questions stated earlier we can come to the conclusion: 
1. Cross border M&A represents a strategic growth mechanism especially 
when growth is to be rapidly realized. The most significant motives behind 
cross-border M&A can be highlighted as: 
 new market entry leading to higher market share and power 
 financial synergies that could result from cost efficiency, tax advantages 
or increased sales  
 non-financial synergies that could result from access to competencies 
and talents, shared technologies and R&D 
 diversification strategy through new products, markets or reduced risk 
2. After identifying the right fit for an M&A strategy, the challenge within 
cross border M&As remain in mobilizing those two distant and well 
established and rooted corporate cultures and norms towards creating a third 
culture that combine the best of what both companies have been recognized 
for and excelled at, and what made them an appealing target for each other in 
the first place, aiming at creating a new corporate culture that could be 
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embedded in the new founded business entity. Cultural distance poses the 
greatest challenges for cross border M&A, and giving more attention and 
advanced planning to the cultural distance is significantly needed (Ahammad 
& Glaister, 2013; Rottig, 2007). Where domestic deals do not necessarily 
mean easier or simpler integration, international transactions bring greater 
risk. Research suggests that the challenge is in management capabilities of 
successfully managing the combined cultures and not in the cultural 
differences themselves (Rottig, 2007). 
3. M&A performance measures can be categorized within financial and non-
financial domain. The choice of the key performance measures need to be 
aligned with the targeted evaluation criteria and related to the motives 
behind that deal (El Zuhairy et al., 2015). 
5.2 Limitations and Future Research 
One significant limitation of  the case study approach is that results cannot be 
generalized or replicated for the wider population. Moreover, researchers bias could 
influence or lead to subjectivity as case study approach deals with qualitative and 
descriptive data which depends on individual interpretation (McLeod, 2008), Which is 
the case here as every M&A deal proves to be unique and success or failure in a specific 
case under specific circumstances would not necessarily mean that results can be 
generalized. However, case study approach helps at better understanding what the 
literature has indicated in a specific topic and give the chance to confirm or not the 
theoretical framework in a specific research area. 
The low success rate of international M&As and yet the fact that companies still 
consider M&As to go global represent significant opportunities for future research 
aiming at better understanding what drives and lead to synergies realization in cross 
border M&As which could possibly lead to an improved success rate. 
As mentioned earlier, Stahl and Mendenhall (2005) indicated that “despite the extensive 
body of research on M&A that has accumulated over the last thirty years, the key 
factors for M&A success and the reasons why so many M&A fail remain poorly 
understood” (Stahl & Mendenhall, 2005), cited by (Rottig, 2007, p. 113). Therefore, 
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there are opportunities for further as reasons for underperformance in cross border 
M&As and empirical findings are mixed and inconclusive (Rottig, 2007). 
Hopefully, this work could bring together a sound understanding of the researched topic 
and can be a slight addition of what have been done in this area. Giving the importance 
of M&A as value creation mechanism in the corporate long term strategy, a better 
understanding might lead to an improved success rate and better control towards 
realization of a deal's objectives. 
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Annex 1: Demonstration of the full version of the M&A Framework 
 Motives  Main Success Factor  KSIs (Key success indicators) 
1 
Benefiting from 
Diversification 
 
Communicating with Acquired 
Organization on Diversification 
Strategy (Related vs. Unrelated) 
and Objectives  
* Ability to Add New Products 
and Markets 
 * Increase in Annual Revenue  
 
Identifying Main Diversification 
Areas (in Products, Markets, 
Suppliers, etc.)  
Developing Detailed 
Diversification Action Plan  
2 
Reacting to Hyper-
competition 
Competition Analysis for the 
Firm Position on the Market  
* Increase of Market Share  
* Increase in Gross Profit  
* Increase in Customer 
Satisfaction  
 
Developing Competition 
Strategic Plan  
Developing Business Scenarios 
Based on Expected Competition 
Reactions  
3 
Capitalizing on Integration 
 
Communicating with Acquired 
Org. on Integration Strategy 
(Vertical vs. Horizontal) and 
Objectives  
*Securing Sources of Supply and 
Raw Materials  
*Increase in Distribution Power  
*High Flexibility in 
Supply/Distribution  
 
Developing Detailed Integration 
Action Plan  
4 
Accelerating Growth 
Developing Future Expansion 
Plan Aligned with Acquiring 
Org. Plan  
* Speed of Increase in Annual 
Revenue 
* Speed of Increase in Bottom 
Line (NP)  
* Increase of Market Share  
 
Securing/Expanding Sources for 
Growth  
5 
Perceiving Underutilized and 
Undervalued Assets 
Developing Assets Management 
Plan for Undervalued Assets  
* Return on Assets (ROA) 
* Return on Investment (ROI) 
* Percent of Revenue from 
Utilization  
 
Developing Resources 
Utilization Plan for 
Underutilized Assets  
6 
Anticipating Synergies 
Selecting Complementing 
Products to Ensure Synergies  
* Optimization in Operations Cost 
* Employees‟ Productivity  
 Identifying Key Synergies Areas 
(Marketing and Sales, 
Operations, HR, Finance) 
Developing Detailed Synergy 
Action Plan  
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7 
Utilizing Financial Strengths 
Conducting Financial Capacities 
Analysis to Explore Financial 
Strengths and Weaknesses  
* Return on Investment (ROI) 
* Return on Equity (ROE)  
 
Developing Financial 
Development Plan Focusing on 
Financial Targets and Tools  
Planning for the Enhancement of 
Borrowing and Funding 
Accessibility  
8 Benefiting in Tax Area Securing Tax Exemption  Full Tax Exemption  
9 
Acquiring Management Team 
Developing Long-term 
Retention Plan for Acquired 
Management Team  
Percent of Retained Employees 
from Targeted Management Team  
10 
Accessing New Technologies 
and Processes 
Developing Utilization Plan for 
New Acquired Technologies and 
Processes  
 
Developing 
Investment/Enhancement Plan 
for R&D  
HR Management for New 
Technical Team  
11 Ego - Emotional and 
Psychological Reasons 
Developing Detailed 
Communication Plan  
M&A Recognition from the 
Community  
Source: (El Zuhairy et al., 2015) 
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Annex 2: DaimlerChrysler shares' exchange 
Market Value 
Daimler-Benz 
Shareholders 
Chrysler Shareholders 
May 5, 1998 $58.1 Billion (68.4%) $26.8 Billion (31.6%) 
Actual exchange for 
DaimlerChrysler Shares 
58.6% 41.4% 
Source: Adapted from (Blas̆ko et al., 2000) 
Marker value before the merger announcement was $58.1 billion for Daimler's 
shareholders and $26.8 billion for Chrysler's shareholders, and based on that market 
capitalization, Chrysler shares of the combined company would be 31.6%. The actual 
exchange ratio for DaimlerChrysler share was set at 1:1.005 for Daimler shareholders 
and 1:0.6235 for Chrysler shareholders, which rise Chrysler shares of the new company 
to 41.4%. Resulting in Chrysler shareholders receiving 31% premium over the closing 
prices on May 5, 1998. 
